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Chapter 10
Matching FinTech Advice to Participant
Needs: Lessons and Challenges
Stephen L. Deschenes and P. Brett Hammond

The provision of goods and services online is growing rapidly across a wide
range of industries, including ﬁnancial services. In ﬁnancial services, online
innovation has often focused on transforming the back and middle ofﬁces,
assisting investment management (the front ofﬁce) in order to realize
economies of scale and/or networking effects. By contrast, now we are
seeing the application of increased computing power, internet bandwidth,
and cloud capacity to customer acquisition, service, education, and advice.
In this vein, online ﬁnancial robo-advice has garnered signiﬁcant public
attention and sizable venture capital funding based on the promise that,
through digitization, advice offerings can deliver a quality experience to
individual investors at lower cost, thereby disrupting the ﬁnancial industry.
While robo-advice is arguably in its early days, some lessons and continuing challenges are already emerging, shaped by several identiﬁable forces
that we consider from the perspective of both the investor and the advice
provider. This chapter takes both perspectives by reviewing the goals and
objectives of robo-advice, the evolving business models, and available
evidence on the demographics of robo-advice, the advice ‘models,’ and
investor behavior. We conclude that, on the customer side, robos are
being used not only by afﬂuent Millennial investors, but also by others
who want fast, mobile, and easy access to their ﬁnances. On the business
side, early proponents promised to upend or disrupt the ﬁnancial advice
industry. Yet in practice, robo-advice is used by both traditional and startup
providers to replace entirely traditional ‘human touch’ advice delivery
models, but also to reach new customers and serve current ones. Moreover,
providing advice is not enough: to be successful, ﬁrms must also sell advicedriven investments fulﬁlled by passive exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and
mutual funds.
For both investors and providers, the overall effect is to lower prices of
individualized advice as well as to enable providers to offer and users to
select from price and customization points on the advice spectrum. Consequently, advice is coming in various ﬂavors including ‘pure’ robo-advice,
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hybrid robo-advice supplemented by a ‘human touch,’ traditional face-to-face
advising (sometimes supplemented by online tools), and advice embodied in
low-cost products such as target date and other allocation funds.
It is too early to say which are strong or weak trends, and robo-advice
models differ in terms of their underlying algorithms, the resulting advice
offered, and ease of access. In rising markets, these differences may not be as
discernable as they will be during a market downturn. We conclude by
considering where the advice experience might be going, including what
will happen during an industry shakeout. We also consider the potential for
further evolution of investment offerings to include actively managed funds
able to better manage market swings. Clearly robo-advice offers numerous
promises, yet little evidence is available so far on the actual effects of using
advice, such as changes in asset allocation and long-term effects on ﬁnancial
security.

Understanding the Robo-advice Experience
Many might think the robo-advice experience would be shaped entirely by
the nature, quality, and presentation of information provided to investors
via an automated tool. Accordingly, one could focus on the technical algorithms behind online advice, the details of the advice offered, and the look
and feel of the interface. Yet in practice, the robo-experience is also powerfully shaped by the complexity of the ﬁnancial problems that this advice is
meant to address. This includes the prescriptiveness of the advice system,
individual investor characteristics including goals, objectives, and behaviors,
and the availability and suitability of different investment options. In turn,
these are structured by the goals and organizational arrangements of advice
provider ﬁrms.
As noted by Fisch et al. (2019), robo-advice tends to cover pre-tax and
after-tax asset allocation and fund selection through time, as well as saving
and spending; less often does it include estate and tax plans. As such, roboadvice stands at one end of a customization and regulatory oversight continuum. Financial education is at the other end, where ﬁrms and advisors
provide information about the beneﬁts of saving, investing, and asset allocation without reference to individuals’ circumstances (see Figure 10.1).
Customization and complexity. Guidance tends to offer clients saving targets
and broad asset allocation recommendations, but it generally does not
recommend speciﬁc securities or investment products. By contrast, advice
goes beyond education and guidance to cover speciﬁc recommendations
for ﬁnancial products suitable for individuals. As such, advice implies
that the advisor has gathered necessary and sufﬁcient information about
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Robo-Advice
Traditional ‘Human-Touch’ Advice

Customization

Advice

Guidance

Education

Saving

Asset Allocation
Portfolio Construction
Rebalancing

Spending

Tax Planning
Estate Planning

Complexity

Figure 10.1 Customization and complexity in the advice space
Note: Currently, robo-advice offerings largely focus on asset allocation, fund selection, and
rebalancing.
Source: Author’s analysis.

High Digital Delivery
‘Pure’
Robo-Advice

Low Digital
Generation/
Analysis

High Digital
Analysis/
Generation

‘Golf ’ Relationship

‘Traditional’ High-Touch Delivery
Backed by Model-Driven
Solutions
High Human Touch Delivery

Figure 10.2 Digitization of advice generation and delivery
Source: Authors’ analysis.
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TABLE . Types of robo-advice and ﬁrms in the US marketplace
Type

Description

Level of discretion

Clients

Examples

Guidance

Portfolio
assessment which
determines a
recommended
allocation

Nondiscretionary,
nonadvisory

All clients

E*Trade’s
Online Advisor

Financial
planning

One time full
review of portfolios
which determines
potential to meet
ﬁnancial goals.
Makes
recommendations
on savings rates,
withdrawal rates,
optimized
allocation, and
investments for
meeting goals.

Nondiscretionary,
advisory

Complimentary
for clients
meeting asset
threshold.
Available for fee
to other clients

Vanguard’s
ﬁnancial
planning group

Managed
accounts

Provider
determines
appropriate
allocation and
investments and
provides ongoing
portfolio
management.

Usually
discretionary,
advisory

Clients pay assetbased fee.
Account
minimums vary,
start as low as
$20K.

Fidelity’s
Portfolio
Advisory
Service®

Private
client

Provider
determines
appropriate
allocation and
investments and
provides ongoing
portfolio
management.
Client receives
other services as
necessary such as
tax, estate, and
ﬁnancial planning.

Discretionary,
advisory

Clients pay an
asset-based fee,
minimums
usually around
$500K.

Schwab’s
Private Client

RIA
referral

Provider refers a
client seeking
advice to an local
RIA who custodies
assets with the
direct provider.

N/A

Clients with
more complex
ﬁnancial needs

TD
Ameritrades’
AdvisorDirect™

Note : RIA refers to Registered Investment Advisor.
Source : Analysis based on authors’ survey of advisor offerings.
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the client and evaluated it to determine the suitability of investment
recommendations.1 Left for interpretation are the practical deﬁnitions
of sufﬁcient and suitable investment recommendations.
From an investor’s perspective, the overall objective is to save, invest, and
spend to meet his or her goals. From the advice provider’s perspective, the
objective is to adequately serve the investor, to meet ﬁduciary responsibilities, and to gather and/or retain assets. While the investor’s and the
provider’s objectives are not identical, both the investor and the provider
are interested in efﬁciency, balancing the costs of information gathering,
evaluation, and advice delivery against the beneﬁts of potential increases in
lifetime consumption.
Theoretical research shows that when portfolio and/or ﬁnancial advice is
adopted early in consumers’ lives, the certainty-equivalent consumption
generated for clients can rise by 1.1 percent per year over the entire lifetime
(Kim et al. 2016), and by 23 percent during retirement (Blanchett and
Kaplan 2013). Although those studies do not distinguish between traditional
and robo-advice, they are particularly applicable to robo-advice since they
apply robo-like systematic and rules-based approaches to ﬁnancial behavior.
As such, robo-advisors claim to offer some or most of the customization a
ﬁnancial advisor can provide, while they do it systematically and precisely via
software algorithms that are documentable, replicable, and repeatable, and
potentially at lower cost. What sets robos apart is their potential through
digitization, automation, and ease of use, to systematize advice offering and
lower its cost for current investors and new consumers (see Figure 10.2).
Many different organizational arrangements are associated with roboadvisors. In some cases, stand-alone robo-advisors offer advice online. In
other cases, full-service ﬁnancial services ﬁrms use automated asset allocation advice as one of many tools to assist ﬁnancial advisors in working oneon-one with investors to construct and manage portfolios and make other
ﬁnancial planning decisions (see Table 10.1).

Evolution, Not Revolution
The automated or digitized features of robo-advice did not spring forth
fully formed. Thus robo-advice started in 2008 with Betterment followed
by Wealthfront, and in the early days the focus was on rebalancing across
target date funds (Scott-Briggs 2016). In turn, this process was inspired by
Mint, an online checking account aggregator, later sold to Intuit (Future
Advisor 2015). Nevertheless, this Silicon Valley-centric view gives insufﬁcient attention to the earlier antecedents of robo-advice such as Mpower
and Financial Engines, which were startups offering services to employers
and their employees. For example, Financial Engines, Ibbotson, and other
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independent robo-advisors provided pre-tax asset allocation and savings
advice through deﬁned contribution (DC) plans, when employers sought
to offer employees ﬁnancial advice but were legally required to do so via
an independent provider.
Adoption and takeup of such advice was initially disappointing, both in
terms of numbers of individuals and amounts of revenue. Subsequently,
Ibbotson was sold to Morningstar, and both Financial Engines and Morningstar offered to manage the assets on which they gave advice. As of 2018,
Financial Engines had nearly one million advised and managed accounts
inside employer plans at nearly 150 Fortune 500 ﬁrms, with a growing
number of customers through the Wells Fargo-managed 401k platform
(Toonkel and Randall 2015).
More recently, Financial Engines moved into managed income for 401k
accounts and IRA rollovers. This advice plus asset management business
model, pre- and/or post-tax, has now become the industry standard, for
standalone ﬁrms and ﬁnancial services conglomerates. In addition, traditional ﬁnancial ﬁrms such as Fidelity, Vanguard, and TIAA also began to
offer online advice as a way of retaining assets and gathering more through
additional services.

The Robo-advice Process
Robo-advice processes and models differ not only in terms of what they
cover, but also by the intensity of human involvement. Many investors learn
about robo-advisors via online, radio, or television advertising; word of
mouth; an employer pension plan; or, in some cases, a ﬁnancial advisor’s
recommendation. One or more of these would prompt a visit to the roboadvisor’s website. Overall, the advice process involves initial awareness,
assessment, modeling, results and recommendations and follow-up. Each
of these steps may be conducted exclusively online, or via telephone or faceto-face interactions with a human advisor.
Assessment. Investment advice is often provided based on a web-based
questionnaire used to assess the investor’s goals, ﬁnancial circumstances,
and personal characteristics. As with other aspects of robo-advice, the purpose and quality of questionnaires varies across the industry. Such assessments are used to gauge investors’ risk perceptions and risk tolerance, as
well as risk capacity. These are usually summarized in a risk tolerance score
or label, such as ‘conservative,’ ‘moderately conservative,’ ‘moderate,’ ‘moderately aggressive,’ or ‘aggressive.’ At a ﬁnancial ﬁrm where an investor
already has a relationship, some ﬁnancial and personal information may
be transported over from the investor’s current accounts.
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Some question this approach to measuring risk tolerance and risk
perception-related responses since behavioral research has shown that people often behave in what appears to be non-rational ways. Examples in the
literature include asymmetric risk aversion (prospect theory), anchoring,
and the ‘house money’ effect (where 20 percent loss after a 20 percent gain
is perceived differently from a 20 percent loss after a previous 20 percent loss).
Additional behavioral factors include ‘dual self ’ theory, where actual behavior differs from self-predicted behavior.
Nevertheless, the psychology literature lends support for the use of validated questionnaires. For instance, questions designed to assess loss aversion and the self-assessed risk of previous ﬁnancial decisions are believed
reliable when explaining variations in people’s portfolio allocations and
investment decisions (Guillemette et al. 2012). Moreover, clients’ risk selfassessments and validated questionnaires have been shown to better determine risk tolerance than ﬁnancial advisors’ assessments (Roszkowski and
Grable 2005; Elsayed and Martin 1998). On the other hand, risk questionnaires rarely are psychometrically tested for validity or reliability, and many
use poorly constructed questions, conﬂate risk tolerance versus risk capacity,
and cannot identify highly risk-averse investors (Kitces 2016). Handling
poor ﬁnancial literacy is also difﬁcult.
As an alternative to assessing an individual’s risk characteristics, a different approach assigns risk to each of an investor’s goals so that, for example,
all investors saving for college would have a similar risk metric which differs
from the risk metric assigned to saving for retirement or paying rent.
Different goals can also be assigned relative importance weights, as implemented by Veritat and WealthBench (Weinrich 2012). While this tactic
requires individuals to identify, schedule, and rank their ﬁnancial goals, it
does avoid the potential pitfalls of individual risk tolerance assessments.
Asset allocation and fund selection calculators. Robo-advisors employ formal models to create investment and savings advice, many of which share a
foundation in modern portfolio theory (MPT). Inputs to these models
include investor risk aversion, age, current assets, and other information
along with the provider’s estimates of expected asset returns, volatilities, and
correlations. Model capabilities range from fairly simple, offering advice on
overall asset allocation and fund packages, to comprehensive, also recommending insurance, trusts, wills, and other ﬁnancial planning products and
services.
Not surprisingly, robo-advisor asset allocation and fund selection models
generate different results depending on statistical assumptions about capital
market processes. Analytic approaches use historical returns and volatilities,
estimated expected inputs, and Bayesian approaches, all of which generate
different predictions. They also can use different measurement periods as

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 12/8/2019, SPi

Matching FinTech Advice to Participant Needs

179

well as re-estimation and historical sampling frequencies. Unlike the mutual
fund industry where fund benchmarks are required and ubiquitous, the
advice industry has not yet established standards on capital market assumptions, measurement periods, or ‘what to solve for.’ Additionally, models and
inputs are rarely made public, making it impossible to compare methodologies and approaches. And, of course, historical evidence can mislead, as
during the ﬁnancial crisis when traditionally uncorrelated securities became
highly correlated.
Advice delivery. In practice, a variety of robo-advice delivery systems has
emerged. Some providers, such as Acorns, enable new customers to download an app to a mobile phone, input basic information, get an allocation
and fund selection recommendation, transfer funds from a personal bank
account, and be up and running within ten minutes. Others work closely
with advisors at independent ﬁrms or ﬁnancial services conglomerates; in
this case, advisors specialize in communications including the initial conversation, advice delivery, portfolio implementation, and additional follow-ups.
An automated system takes care of receiving investor data inputs and producing recommendations, which in turn are conveyed by the advisor. Some
ﬁrms such as Vanguard offer different levels of ‘human touch’ at different
price points.
Investor receptivity. Based on industry surveys of higher net worth households (over $100,000 in investable assets), it appears that many customers
deem it important to have access to their portfolio information at all times
(Cerulli Associates 2017). No matter what the channel (bank, wirehouse,
ﬁnancial advisor, direct investment provider, retirement plan provider) or
size of assets, 20–30 percent of those investors used online tools and calculators, and 30–55 percent viewed their accounts or traded via online tools.
Even for those who did not currently use robo-advisors, 20–45 percent of
those under age 40 were ‘somewhat likely’ or ‘very likely’ to use a roboadvisor, with older and wealthier investors much less unlikely to do so.
Interestingly, when prompted, some 80 percent of those surveyed reported not having heard of most robo-advice providers, the exceptions
being Vanguard and Charles Schwab. Of the 13 most prominent roboproviders, only 2–5 percent of respondents indicated that they used their
robo-services (Cerulli Associates 2017). Those who did cited ease of use and
cost as the main reasons for doing so. Among investors unlikely to use a
digital advice provider, nearly 60 percent preferred human interaction to
technology, and as many as 40 percent of those under age 40 said the same.
Though only a small percentage of the investor population has actually
adopted robo-advice to date, it appears that Millennials and younger cohorts
are more receptive than their predecessors. Among younger investors, roboadvice is most used by those with higher income and net worth, people who
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are online facile, and investors willing to take more risk (Cohen 2018;
Cerulli 2017). Interestingly, investors using robo-advice did so using new
assets rather than transferring assets away from current managers (Cerulli
2017). In other words, robo-advice at present is being used for incremental
savings, tempering the likely growth of the sector.

Investor Behavior and Impact
Of ultimate interest is how robo-advice will shape investors’ consumption,
retirement incomes, and overall well-being. As noted above, theoretical
studies predict improvements in these, but real-world evidence is sparse.
Early research by Warshawsky and Ameriks (2000), Bodie (2003), Kotlifoff
(2006), Dowd et al. (2008), and Turner (2010) evaluated the advice provided, and these studies found signiﬁcant shortcomings. These included the
fact that too little ﬁnancial information was gathered, risk tolerance assumptions were not well-grounded, overall net worth was not examined, asset
allocation models and advice were too simplistic, and the client interfaces
were often confusing.
More recently, comparisons of robo-offerings have become popular and
can be found on a variety of ﬁnancial websites (e.g., Investor Junkie, Investopedia, Kiplinger, Motley Fool, and more). Still, while most compare
features and ease of use, few examine results or impacts. A more systematic
examination of advice was offered by Aon Hewitt Financial Engines (2014)
which studied 14 large DC plans offering three types of ‘help’ or advice. The
topics covered included target-date funds, managed accounts, and online
advice based on data from 2006 to 2012. During that period, online or roboadvice was used by only 5.4 percent of all plan participants, compared to
17 percent for target date plans (TDF) and 12 percent for managed accounts, while the rest (a little less than 65 per cent) were self-directed.2
Target-date fund usage was driven primarily by an automatic enrollment
(‘opt-out’) feature in some plans, while managed account and robo-advice
usage was entirely ‘opt-in.’
Regarding returns, plan participants opting for any kind of ‘help’ or
advice between 2006 and 2012 achieved over 3 percent better net annual
returns compared to participants not opting for help. Those using a combination of TDFs and self-directed investing did better than fully selfdirected participants by about 90 bps/year, but they did signiﬁcantly worse
than participants receiving any form of help or advice (by about 2 percent
per year). Notably, the return differences between participants using different types of help or advice were negligible.
Prior research has conﬁrmed that most inﬂuential contributor to longterm ﬁnancial security is the individual’s contribution rate, followed by the
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length of the contribution period (Hammond and Richards 2010). Therefore, it is useful to note that the Aon Hewitt Financial Engines (2014) study
found that online advisees had the highest contribution rates of any group,
9 percent on average, versus 4.4 percent for TDF participants, 7.5 percent
for managed account participants, and 6.6 percent for self-directed participants. While managed account participants were older than online advice
users, online advice users had signiﬁcantly higher average account balances
than other plan participants.
Though hardly deﬁnitive, this evidence suggests that advice—including
robo-advice—has been associated with better outcomes, at least in the shortto-medium time frame. While we cannot know whether advice seekers
would have done better in the absence of advice than non-advice seekers,
it is safe to conclude that advice, including robo-advice is not harmful and
may be helpful.
In a related chapter (Fisch et al. 2019), the authors survey in some detail
the nature of these models and the quality of the actual advice offered by
robo-advisors. That study noted that, while an individual investor would
receive the same advice with repeated visits to a single provider’s website,
he or she could be provided with different advice from different providers
due to different ways of assessing risk tolerance and ﬁnancial circumstances,
the underlying model, and the model’s inputs. Some models have been
validated by the experience of their recommended portfolios through a full
business cycle, while others have yet to experience a full cycle. It is also
important to note that many studies suffer from self-selection or the tendency for people who use advisors (versus those who do not) to be more
likely to take steps that positively affect their wealth and lifetime consumption, regardless of what the advisor recommends.
Research by Marsden et al. (2011) that controlled for self-selection
showed that some types of activities increased when working with a
ﬁnancial advisor (e.g., goal setting, calculating retirement needs, portfolio diversiﬁcation), yet there were no signiﬁcant effects on saving rates
and short-term asset values. Other evidence comes from comparing advisors
with brokers, as the latter are not required to act in clients’ best interest. In
an experiment (Guillemette and Jurgensen 2017) and also in a comparative
study (Martin and Finke 2012), advice from a certiﬁed ﬁnancial planner
resulted in higher investor account balances than did broker advice.
A comparative study by Chalmers and Reuter (2012) concluded that investment outcomes associated with broker advice were considerably worse than
from self-directed portfolios and target date funds. Work by Hoechle et al.
(2018) that accounted for self-selection found that bank customers who
followed bank advisor recommendations did worse than had they followed
a broad stock benchmark. Yet on the whole, these studies did not focus on
robo-advisors.
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An Ongoing Case Study
An interesting ongoing analysis sponsored by Condor Capital (2018) is
focusing on the effects of robo-advice by establishing both taxable and taxdeferred accounts at 20 prominent robo-advisors, some standalone while
others form part of a broader ﬁnancial services ﬁrm.3 The taxable accounts
established used an investor proﬁle appropriate to a long-term investor with
a moderate risk tolerance, while the tax-deferred account used the proﬁle of
a long-term investor with a high risk tolerance. In analyzing the ﬁndings, it is
important to keep in mind that this analysis is limited by the short time
frame (two years or fewer) and the effects of many unknown variables
including the speciﬁc funds used to build portfolios, and when the providers
changed asset allocations.
Several outcomes from the Condor Capital report on taxable account
experience are worth highlighting; ﬁndings and relative comparisons were
roughly similar for tax-deferred accounts. First, robo-advisor fees vary across
ﬁrms and within ﬁrms by size of assets. In some cases, they also differ by
whether the account holder uses only the digital platform or supplements it
with a human advisor. As seen in Table 10.2, robo-only taxable account fees
vary from zero bps (per year) on the account assets, to about 90 bps, with
most fees in the 25–30 bps range. Minimum investment amounts also vary,
from none to $100,000.
Presumably, low fee and low minimum robo-offerings are cross-subsidized
by investment management and other charges. When ‘premium’ or ‘selective’ service is offered (i.e., the ability to work with a human advisor), fees are
15–25 bps higher over digital-only service, for totals in the 40–50 bps range.
This may be compared to managed accounts, where fees are typically at least
twice that. Note that for many premium robo offerings, account minimums
are higher as well.
Second, we compare outcomes regarding asset allocation and fund selection. The classic rule-of-thumb for a medium-risk tolerant, long-term investor is a 60/40 portfolio (60 percent equities and 40 percent bonds, with an
expected annual volatility of about 10 percent). In Table 10.3, we see that 11
of the 20 robo-advisor equity allocations were within 2 percentage points of
the classic allocation (60 percent) for a similar investor proﬁle.
Overall, allocations ranged from 56 to 71 percent equity and from 22 to
41 percent ﬁxed income, with between 0 and 15 percent in ‘miscellaneous’
investments and cash. Within equities, the allocation to domestic equities
(versus international equities) ranged from 45 to 75 percent.
It is worth noting that many robo-advisors are active allocators and manage
their portfolios dynamically or even tactically, both in terms of the equity/
ﬁxed income split and the domestic equity/international equity split. For
example, while Betterment did not change its allocations during the last two
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TABLE . Taxable account fees and investment minimums for  robo-advisors
Advisor

Fees

Account Minimums

Acorns
Ally Financial
Betterment

$1/mo <$5K; 25 bps/yr >$5K
30 bps/yr
25 bps/yr digital only; 40 bps ‘Plus’ (unlimited
chat, 1 call/yr w/advisor); 50 bps ‘Premium’
(unlimited calls and chat); no fee if assets >
$2M
25 bps digital only; 50 bps ‘Premium’ (access to
live advisor)
30 bps/yr
35 bps/yr
50 bps/yr
75 bps/yr <$50K; decreasing to 30 bps/yr to
$1M and above
45 bps/yr
89 bps/yr <$1M; decreasing above $1M
No fee digital only; 28 bps/yr for access to live
advisor
No fee <$10K; 25 bps/yr >$10K
No fee <$10K; 25 bps/yr >$10K; no fee if client
has a SoFi loan
30 bps/yr ‘Essential’; higher fee tiering
depending on asset size and portfolio
‘Selective’
30 bps/yr
30 bps yr <$5M; decreasing above $5M
No fee <$10K; 25 bps/yr >$10K
50 bps/yr <$100K; 40 bps/yr >$100K
No fee
50 bps/yr <$100K; 35 bps/yr >$100K

None
$2,500
None digital only;
$100K ‘Plus’ and
‘Premium’

Ellevest
E*Trade (ETFs)
Fidelity Go
FutureAdvisor
Hedgeable
Merrill Edge
Personal Capital
Schwab
SigFig
SoFi
TD Ameritrade

TIAA
Vanguard
WealthFront
WealthSimple
WiseBanyan
Zack’s Advantage

None digital only; $50K
premium
$5,000
$5,000
$10,000
None
$5,000
$100,000
$5,000
$2,000
$100
$5,000 ‘Essential’;
$25,000 ‘Selective’
$5,000
$50,000
$500
None
None
$5,000

Source: Derived from Condor Capital (2018).

years, TD Ameritrade raised its equity allocation from 65 to 71 percent and
lowered its domestic equity allocation from 65 to 60 percent. For the funds in
the Condor Capital study (2018), we see that robo-advisors generally used
index funds, particularly on the equity side. Unsurprisingly, then, the equity
allocations all showed similar large-cap blend behavior, with a pronounced
tilt toward large-cap stocks and a slight tilt toward growth stocks. Fixed
income holdings were more diverse across providers, with some favoring
municipal bonds, treasury inﬂation protected securities (TIPS), and Treasuries, while others tilted toward emerging markets; still others were closer to
‘neutral.’ Nearly all of the ﬁxed income allocations were neutral to negative
on corporate, high-yield, and mortgage-backed securities.

61
59
56
60
68

62
61
60
65
61

59
58
62
65
58

Fidelity Go
FutureAdvisor
Hedgeable
Merrill Edge
Personal Capital

Schwab
SigFig
SoFi
TD Ameritrade
TIAA

Vanguard
WealthFront
WealthSimple
WiseBanyan
Zack’s Advantage

41
41
38
35
32

23
37
40
33
37

39
41
34
39
25

38
38
35
36
39

Fixed
Income

2017

0
0
0
0
0

5
0
0
0
0

0
0
8
0
5

0
2
0
0
0

Misc

Source: Derived from Condor Capital (2018).

62
59
65
62
60

Equities

Acorns
Ally Financial
Betterment
Ellevest
E*Trade (ETFs)

Advisor

0
1
0
0
9

10
2
0
2
3

0
0
2
1
2

0
1
0
2
1

Cash

62
63
62
65
58

64
63
60
71
62

60
59
59
60
71

62
61
65
56
61

Equities

Allocation %

38
35
38
35
32

22
35
40
28
36

40
39
32
36
24

38
37
35
41
36

Fixed
Income

2018

0
0
0
0
0

4
0
0
0
0

0
0
8
0
4

0
0
0
0
0

Misc

0
2
0
0
9

11
2
0
2
2

1
1
2
4
11

0
3
0
2
2

Cash

TABLE . Taxable account asset allocations and equity splits for  robo-advisors

61
69
66
62
72

51
59
67
65
61

71
49
79
66
70

84
69
49
71
75

Domestic

29
31
34
38
38

49
41
33
35
29

29
51
21
34
30

16
31
51
29
25

International

2017

60
70
66
63
72

51
60
66
60
71

70
45
79
64
69

75
59
49
63
76

Domestic

Equity split %

40
30
34
37
28

49
40
34
40
29

30
55
21
36
31

25
41
51
73
24

International

2018
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Third, we compare the investment performance for a moderately risk
tolerant investor in Figures 10.3 and 10.4. For the seven providers with twoyear results, total returns varied from 21 to 27 percent (10–13% on an
annualized basis). For these same providers, Sharpe Ratios were impressive,
ranging from 1.5 (Acorns) to 2.2 (Schwab)%. Of course, these results are
indicative of recent robust equity markets. A better test of what robo-advisors
can deliver will come during market downturns, as may be gleaned from a
glance at the upside and downside capture ratios of the accounts having twoyear histories. Figure 10.5 shows that the providers with better downside
capture ratios (i.e., capture less of any market decline) are to the left, and
those with better upside capture (i.e., capture more of any market increase)
are higher, so providers that are up and to the left have better upside/
downside capture ratios.
Two providers (Vanguard and Betterment) appear right at the center,
both of which had identical 65/35 asset allocations that did not change over
the two years. Interestingly, Schwab had a nearly identical allocation to
equities (64%), but a lower allocation to ﬁxed income and a signiﬁcant allocation to cash (10–11%), which presumably provided downside
protection while preserving equity exposure. On the other end, while
Acorns had a slightly lower equity allocation (62%), it had the highest
allocation to domestic equities of any provider; the recent outperformance
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Figure 10.3 Taxable account portfolio and asset returns (%) for 20 robo-advisors
‘moderate risk’ investor
Note: Condor Capital and Backend Benchmarking report that they established accounts at 20
robo-advisors, 7 at the beginning of 2016 and an additional 14 at the beginning of 2017.
Source: Data from Condor Capital (2018).
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Figure 10.4 Taxable account annualized risk/return statistics for seven robo-advisors
with two years of returns (as of the end of 2017)
Source: Data from Condor Capital (2018).
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Figure 10.5 Upside/downside capture ratio for seven robo-advice providers with two
years of returns (as of the end of 2017)
Source: Data from Condor Capital (2018).

of international equities thus lowered returns and limited the allocation’s
downside protection.
In the years to come, the Condor Capital project will generate a longerterm view of the impact and characteristics of robo-advice offerings. Only
then can we draw ﬁrmer conclusions about the long-term impact of roboadvice on investor wellbeing.
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Conclusions
To date, robo-advice has been concentrated among younger and more
afﬂuent investors, so changes in usage may be gradual and cohort-driven.
These investors seem drawn to robo-advice by its ease of access and usage,
compared to the time, number of forms, signatures, and face-to-face meetings required in most traditional advice and investment offerings. There is
also promising early evidence that investors who used online advice save
more and improve returns compared to investors who did not.
While robo-advice is apparently not producing a major disruption in the
types of ﬁrms offering advice, the industry is changing. There is a proliferation of standalone robo-advice ﬁrms where the early ﬁrms moved from
charging for advice without direct asset management, to charging for advice
embedded along with managed accounts. Moreover, traditional investment
ﬁrms and advisors are buying startup robo-advice ﬁrms, licensing technology, and creating new tiered advice models. These traditional ﬁrms are also
adopting so-called ‘cyborg solutions’—part-human, part-computer, in the
way face-to-face banking with tellers evolved to include on-line banking as an
option. As with other services, ﬁrms are likely to use robo-advice to attract
and retain customers attracted to its ease of use along with their assets.
The next big test will be a market downturn. Some standalone startups
have already survived at least one major market shakeout (for instance,
Financial Engines and others established before the global ﬁnancial crisis).
We can expect that differences in allocations and advice delivery will be
made evident in the next shakeout.
Nevertheless, more remains to be learned about how robo-advice content
and models, as well as industry organization and delivery, affect behavior.
A related question is whether robo-advice obviates the need for improved
ﬁnancial literacy. And crucially, although beyond the scope of the present
chapter, legal and regulatory concerns are raised by advice generally and roboadvice in particular. Some of these are addressed elsewhere in this volume by
Baker and Delleart (2019), Fisch et al. (2019), and Polansky et al. (2019).

Notes
1. Financial education, guidance, and advice all have speciﬁc regulatory deﬁnitions.
For example, a discussion of what ﬁnancial advice covers in the UK is reported in
HM Treasury (2017).
2. To count, a participant had to have at least 95 percent of her assets in the TDF.
3. Sponsored and reported by Condor Capital, this ongoing study is being conducted by Backend Benchmarking. Not that some prominent ﬁrms were not
included in this study, most notably Financial Engines, which is one of the oldest
and most successful robo-advisors.
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